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ESTABLISHING DECISIONMAKING
STANDARDS FOR MEDICAL
TREATMENT TO PROTECT THE
CIVIL RIGHTS OF
HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS
I. INTRODUCTION
The prospects for improving the civil rights of the nation's handicapped
appeared good during the 1970's, especially in the areas of employment, edu-
cation, transportation, and health care. This decade was marked by exten-
sive federal legislation and litigation that mandated and funded progressive
rehabilitation programs. These programs helped handicapped persons to
maintain a steady integration into the social and economic mainstream of
society.'
Ironically, during this same period, a discriminatory practice against
handicapped newborn babies was being quietly advanced in the nation's hos-
pital nurseries.2 Some handicapped newborns were being denied lifesaving
medical care, not because surgery or other medical intervention was useless
1. Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority, 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977) (ruling
that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 establishes affirmative rights for qualified
handicapped citizens in programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance and a pri-
vate cause of action can be implied to vindicate those rights); Michigan Association for Re-
tarded Citizens v. Smith, 475 F. Supp. 990 (E.D. Mich. 1979), aft'd, 657 F.2d 102 (6th Cir.
1981) (case seeking to remedy institutional abuses by providing effective family-scale residen-
tial services in the community); Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens v. Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (first "right to education" case
opening a free, appropriate public education to all disabled children); Education of All Handi-
capped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1975); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 701 (1973).
2. Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery, 289 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973) (two Yale-New Haven pediatricians reported that fourteen percent of
the infant deaths in their hospital were caused by or related to withholding treatment. They
called for a revision of the law to officially permit this practice); Jonsen, Phibbs, Tooley, &
Garland, Critical Issues in Newborn Intensive Care: A Conference Report and Policy Proposal,
55 PEDIATRICS 756 (1975) (report of the Sonoma Valley Conference in California supporting
in theory the concept of direct intervention to end the life of a disabled but self-sustaining
baby) [hereinafter cited as Jonsen]; Todres, Krane, Howell, & Shannon, Pediatricians' Atti-
tudes Affecting Decision-Making in Defective Newborns, 60 PEDIATRICS 197 (1977) (survey of
Massachusetts pediatricians' attitudes relating to medical management of handicapped infants
showing that a majority of physicians modify their attitudes in accord with the parents'
wishes); Shaw, Randolph, & Manard, Ethical Issues in Pediatric Surgery: A National Survey of
Pediatricians and Pediatric Surgeons, 60 PEDIATRICS 588 (1977) (nationwide survey measuring
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or would only prolong dying, but because their parents and physicians be-
lieved that the life of a severely handicapped person was not a life worth
living.
3
Secrecy surrounded this practice, and most cases were not brought to the
attention of the legal authorities. When they were, prosecutors were reluc-
tant to bring the cases before juries likely to be sympathetic with the par-
ents.4 Almost overnight, however, the veil of secrecy disappeared, due to the
nationwide media attention given to the judicially approved starvation death
of a Down's Syndrome infant in Bloomington, Indiana, on April 15, 1982.,
There, the parents not only refused necessary surgery to allow the child to
eat normally, but they also told the hospital to stop intravenous injections of
food and water.6 When the hospital sought a judicial opinion on the legality
of nontreatment, the court ruled that the hospital could legally withhold
nourishment.7 The child died six days later from starvation and
dehydration.'
Reaction against the child's death was widespread, and during the last
three years the controversy surrounding the Baby Doe case in Indiana, and
an analogous case in New York state, has blossomed into a national debate
over the denial of treatment to handicapped newborns.9 Unfortunately, the
two controlling federal cases have failed to adequately clarify the most im-
portant issues involved in this complex area of medicine and ethics-the
the attitude of physicians toward ethical questions surrounding medical treatment for disabled
and very sick children).
3. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM
OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 35 (1983) (finding by the Commission that handicapped newborn
babies were frequently denied life-saving medical care simply because of their handicaps). See
Smith, Triage: Endgame Realities. I J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL. 143 (1985).
4. Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns" A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 213-44 (1975). For other works on the legal aspects of selective infanticide, see Horan,
Medical Treatment and the Mongoloid Child: Death as a Treatment of Choice, 27 BAYLOR L.
REV. 76 (1975); Comment, Defective Newborns: Inconsistent Application of Legal Principles
Emphasized by the Infant Doe Case, 14 TEx. TECH L. REV. 569 (1983).
5. In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-00 (Cir. Ct. Monroe County, Ind. Apr. 12, 1982),
a.0'd sub nom, State of Indiana on Relation of Infant Doe by Guardian by Order of Circuit
Court, No. 482 § 139 (Ind. S. Ct. May 27, 1982), No. 482 § 140 (Ind. S. Ct. April 26), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
6. Id. at 3.
7. Ia
8. Carroll & Andrusko, Baby Doe's Legacy, 1985 AMERICA 450, 451.
9. This is partly due to the fact that the media gave the issue so much attention. For an
excellent critical review of the media coverage of the Baby Doe cases in Indiana and New
York, see Hentoff, Nat Hentoff on the Babies Doe, 10 HUM. LIFE REV. 73 (1984); see also
Death in the Nursery, WNEV-TV (Boston, Mass) (Feb.-Mar. 1983) (local news team explored
infanticide in hospitals around the nation and discovered that withholding lifesaving medical
care is widespread).
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standard for decisionmaking and the identity of the decisionmaker. This
comment will propose a method for analyzing the issues by suggesting an
appropriate standard for decisionmaking and by identifying the proper
decisionmaker.
II. THE STANDARD OF DECISIONMAKING
Two standards used in determining whether to withhold treatment for
handicapped newborns have surfaced in recent years. The courts must even-
tually decide whether to use the quality-of-life or the sanctity-of-life stan-
dard. Proponents of the quality-of-life standard view the less-than-perfect
human life as valuable only in relation to other societal interests such as
parental wishes or costs of care. Often, the underlying and highly subjective
assumption is that a life with a severe handicap is not a life worth living.' °
According to some proponents of this view, a severely handicapped infant is
not a legal person; therefore, the state does not have sufficient interest in
preserving his life necessary to justify the social and economic burden on the
family and society."1
Conversely, those who support the sanctity-of-life standard believe that
every human life has an intrinsic and absolute value that outweighs all other
values. Under this standard, medical care is required unless the patient is in
the process of dying or cannot be helped by treatment. Even in this situa-
tion, nourishment, pain medication, and supportive care are required.
12
10. Gross, Cox, Tatyrek, Pollay, & Barnes, Early Management and Decision Making for
the Treatment of Myelomeningocele, 72 PEDIATRICS 450 (1983).
11. Robertson, supra note 4, at 252-62; Jonsen, supra note 2. See generally Horan, Eutha-
nasia as a Form of Medical Management in DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANASIA196 (D. Horan,
D. Mall ed. 1980) and Dyck, Ethical Reflections on Infanticide in INFANTICIDE AND THE
HANDICAPPED NEWBORN 107 (D. Horan & M. Delahoyde ed. 1982) (in this essay on the
ethical considerations of infanticide, the author discusses the legal implications of defining the
handicapped newborn as a non-person). See generally Brooks, Ethical Dilemmas in the Treat-
ment of Critically Ill Newborns, 1 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL, 133 (1985).
12. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act Amendments of
1983: Hearings on S. 1003 Before the Subcomm. on Family and Human Services of the Comm.
on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-9 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Child
Abuse Act Hearings] (statement of C. Everett Koop, M.D., Surgeon General of the United
States) ("The moral issue here is that no one may judge the quality of life of another, and we
must not tolerate the attempts of those who take it upon themselves to do so. Whether a
handicapped person's life is worth living or not is not a medical question. The Government's
position ought to be seen in the context of its support of the provision of-not the withholding
of- treatment for disabled infants"). See also American Academy of Pediatrics Joint Policy
Statement: Principles of Treatment of Disabled Infants, 73 PEDIATRICS 559 (1984) (signed by
the American Academy of Pediatrics, Association for Retarded Citizens, The National
Asssociation of Children's Hospitals and Related Institutions, Inc., Spina Bifida Association of
America, The Association for Persons with Severe Handicaps, American Association on
Mental Deficiency, American Association of University Affiliated Programs for Persons with
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This section will present the argument that the quality-of-life standard
should be rejected by the courts because it is discriminatory, subjective, and
ambiguous. Moreover, it has the potential to lead to active euthanasia. In
contrast, the sanctity-of-life standard protects the handicapped newborn's
right to life and right to equal medical care. Moreover, it provides clear
guidelines allowing the decisionmaker to consider all relevant circumstances
necessary to guard against a mechanical decisionmaking process. 13
A. Variety of Tests but Only Two Standards
In the current debate over the treatment of handicapped newborns, the
tests for decisionmaking can be categorized as being based on one of two
standards: either the quality-of-life standard or the sanctity-of-life standard.
Using this framework, this Comment will analyze the technical criteria, the
cost-benefit, and the substituted judgment tests. This comment will analyze
the technical criteria, the cost-benefit, and the best-interests tests. The tech-
nical and the cost-benefit tests rely heavily on the quality-of-life standard,
while the best-interests test may stress either of the two standards, depend-
ing on the interpretation of "best interests."' 4
Developmental Disabilities, American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities, Inc., and the
National Down's Syndrome Congress) (hereinafter cited as Principles of Treatment].
13. There is a difference between cases involving a newborn child with a malformation or
some kind of congenital defect (handicapped newborn baby) and one who is of low birthweight
and is simply underdeveloped (premature baby). Physicians in neonatology wards make daily,
sometimes hourly, decisions whether to stop treatment on premature babies, based on whether,
in their best medical judgment, the child is in the process of dying. In such cases, further
medical treatments are futile. This is different from a decision to withhold treatment from a
handicapped baby just because the child is handicapped and will remain handicapped after the
medical treatment. Inevitably, there are times where the two distinctions overlap. For exam-
ple, if a premature baby is denied treatment, not because treatment is futile, but because the
child will survive with a handicap, then that decision is discriminatory. Hearings on the Pro-
tection of Handicapped Newborns, United States Commission on Civil Rights, Original Tran-
script, 9-10, 48 (June 12-14, 1985) (hereinafter cited as Civil Rights Commission Hearings].
Throughout this paper, "equal medical care" will mean that a handicapped child should
receive the same level of care that would be given to a non-handicapped child. In essence, the
handicapped child may not be denied care based on the fact that the child will still have the
handicap after the treatment.
14. In the most comprehensive book written on the topic of nontreatment of handicapped
newborns, author Robert Weir categorizes the different ethical standards of decisionmaking
into five categories: 1) treat all non-dying neonates; 2) terminate the lives of selected non-
persons; 3) withhold treatment according to parental discretion; 4) withhold treatment accord-
ing to quality-of-life projections; and 5) withhold treatment judged not in the child's best inter-
est. Although this is an accurate description of the differing views put forth by various
ethicists, Weir's system of characterization confuses the issue of choosing the appropriate stan-
dard of decisionmaking with the issue of choosing the appropriate decisionmaker. Weir recog-
nizes this problem in his analysis of the different views when he criticizes one ethicist for
basing his standard on the principle that "there is no 'right' decision to be made but only
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1. Technical-Criteria Test
In the early 1970's John Lorber, a pediatrician in Sheffield, England, de-
veloped a selection test that relies on obstensibly technical criteria to evalu-
ate which spina bifida babies to treat. 5 Although at first glance the test
seems to be based purely on medical factors, it is really a value-judgment test
based on the quality-of-life standard. In determining the prognosis of se-
verely afflicted newborn babies, Lorber's method initially considers all the
medical information available to the doctor. However, the decision process
inextricably includes an assessment of the quality of life that handicapped
children would have if they received care and lived. Experience exposed the
main difficulty associated with Lorber's test; some of the children chosen for
nontreatment and death survived unexpectedly, and their handicaps were
more severe because they had not received early aggressive medical
treatment. 16
Critics of Lorber's technical-criteria test have made several proposals to
achieve a higher predictive value. Some said that the criteria could be modi-
fied and improved to insure that fewer severely handicapped children survive
in the nontreatment group.' 7 Others suggested that active euthanasia should
be considered for those who are selected for nontreatment. Since these chil-
dren are selected to die from nontreatment, the commentators effectively
proposed to kill them and shorten their suffering.' 8
2. Cost-Benefit Test
A second test for deciding whether to treat handicapped newborn babies is
'right' persons to make it." R. WEIR, SELECTIVE NONTREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED
NEWBORNS ch. 6 (1984).
15. Lorber, Selective Treatment of Myelomeningocele: To Treat or Not to Treat?, 53 PEDI-
ATRIcS at 307-08 (1974); Veatch, The Technical Criteria Fallacy, 7 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Aug. 1977, at 15. See generally Smith, Defective Newborns and Government Intermeddling, 25
MED. SCI. AND L. 44 (1985).
16. Reid, Spina Bifida: The Fate of the Untreated, 7 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1977,
at 16.
17. Veatch, supra note 15.
18. Reid, supra note 16, at 19 (Reid, as a rationale for his view, argues that just as the
medical profession's attitude toward abortion has changed, so too "[i]t is perfectly conceivable
that the profession's declared attitude to euthanasia will equally reverse itself." He contends
that "[h]uman values are not immutable" and that they must change to keep pace with chang-
ing medical values). See also Gallo, Spina Bifida: The State of the Art of Medical Management,
14 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1984, at 10; but see ChildAbuse Act Hearings, supra note 12,
at 65 (David G. McLone, M.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Surgery, Northwestern Univer-
sity Medical School, and Chairman, Division of Pediatric Neurosurgery, Children's Memorial
Hospital, argues that it is morally and ethically correct to treat all children born with my-
elomeningocele [spina bifida] and that no valid criteria exist for the selection of infants for
nontreatment.)
1986]
260 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 2:255
the cost-benefit analysis. 9 This test assesses the negative and positive eco-
nomic consequences of a specific medical-care policy by assigning specific
numerical values both to the benefits likely to result from medical interven-
tion and to its costs. A quantitative comparison between the predicted costs
and the predicted outcomes allegedly indicates which health-care interven-
tions make the most efficient use of available resources. The cost-benefit
analysis essentially reduces all factors to a common monetary system of
measurement, resulting in mechanical decisionmaking as to whether the
handicapped newborn may live, or must die.
Commentators have noted several flaws in this method when it is applied
to medical care for human beings. For example, Dr. Jerry Avorn, M.D., at
the Harvard Medical School, pointed out that the method contains a hidden
set of value assumptions that virtually guarantees discrimination or a bias in
developing the supposedly objective data.2° The fallacy of the method, he
noted, was that it tried to evaluate human capital based on the principle that
"[d]eath is a great way to cut down on expenses." He argued that people
live in a society, not an economy, and there is no way to measure pain and
suffering, compassion, individual rights, and equity quantitatively.2 This
quality-of-life test places most of its emphasis on the economic burden of
health care and concerns of justice and equity are not considered.22
3. The Best-interests Test
The third test for deciding whether to treat handicapped newborn babies
19. Avorn, Benefit and Cost Analysis in Geriatric Care: Turning Age Discrimination into
Health Policy, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1294 (1984).
20. Id. at 1295.
21. Id. at 1297.
22. Id. at 1298 (Avorn also states that the approach is "subject to another, unrelated
criticism: it is often bad science.").
Another study criticized the use of the cost-benefit test to evaluate neonatal intensive care as
flawed because it relied on projections of future costs and earnings that are to a certain extent
speculative, such as the costs of long-term medical problems and special educational programs
and services. The benefit measured in this study was the average lifetime earnings per survi-
vor. Since it assumed that severely handicapped infants would be unemployable, there were no
cost benefits to the care of handicapped infants. The authors admitted that one of the draw-
backs of the study was that it failed to measure intangible benefits such as the joy of parents
and relatives over the survival of their child. Walker, Feldman, Vohr, & Oh, Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Neonatal Intensive Care for Infants Weighing Less than 1,000 Grams at Birth, 74
PEDIATRICS 20, 24 (1984). See also Johnson, Life, Death, and the Dollar Sign: Medical Ethics
and Cost Containment, 252 J.A.M.A. 223 (July 1984). (Johnson warns against the use of cost-
benefit analysis and states, "What patient groups will be the first victims of this burden of cost
containment? The same groups that are now most vulnerable- the handicapped, the re-
tarded, the chronically ill, and the poor. The humanity of our profession is imperiled by the
cost cutter's knife.").
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is the "best-interests" test in cases that involve treatment decisions for in-
competent patients.23 The theory underlying this test is that since compe-
tent patients have the right to refuse treatment, this right should also extend
to incompetent patients. However, since incompetent patients cannot for-
mulate or present their views, the court appoints a guardian who makes the
decision for the patient. This guardian is required to consider the best inter-
ests of the patient, who presumably would make the same decision if he were
suddenly lucid.24
The best-interests test can be based on either the quality-of-life standard
or the sanctity-of-life standard depending on the interpretation of the term
"best interests."25 Proponents who favor the use of a sanctity-of-life stan-
dard have argued that the patient is best served by starting or continuing
medical treatment unless either no life-saving or life-prolonging treatment
exists, or the treatment would only cause a brief and uncertain delay in the
natural death process. Furthermore, those proposing this standard reject
23. The best-interests test for decisionmaking for incapacitated patients is very similar to
the substituted judgment test. Under the substituted judgment test, the decision made for the
incompetent person should be the very same decision the person would make if he were com-
petent to do so even if the decision is irrational. However, there are some limits to the decision
that can be made by the surrogate that are imposed by law or public policy. Therefore, even if
the incompetent is believed to favor certain types of human research, the surrogate may not
enroll the patient in such research. Also, because there is a public policy against suicide, the
surrogate could not choose such a course of action. In Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp.,
No. 85EO009-GI (Mass. Probate & Family Ct., Norfolk Div., Oct. 21, 1985) the judge found
that Brophy's (the incompetent's) substituted judgment would be to decline the provision of
food and water, and thereby terminate his life. Id. at 30. However, since the state has a
compelling interest in preserving human life, the court said it is "ethically inappropriate to
cause the preventable death of Brophy by the deliberate denial of food and water, which can be
provided to him in a noninvasive, nonintrusive manner which causes no pain and suffering,
irrespective of the substituted judgment of the patient." Id. at 42.
The best-interests test differs from the substituted judgment test in that it requires the deci-
sionmaker to decide from an objective standpoint what will promote a patient's good, irrespec-
tive of the incompetent's actual or supposed preferences. The best-interests test is based on a
"reasonableness" standard that is inherently cautious. It is presumed that the incompetent
will make a reasonable decision. For an excellent legal analysis of these two standards, see
Weber, Substituted Judgment Doctrine: A CriticalAnalysi, I ISSUES IN.L. & MED. 131 (1985).
24. Horan & Grant, Prolonging Life and Withdrawing Treatment: Legal Issues, 50
LINACRE Q. 153, 155-56 (1983). But see Smith, Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative
or Apotheosis?, 63 NEB. L. REV. 709 (1984) (author suggests a construct for decisionmaking
that balances the sanctity-of-life and quality-of-life standards and includes integration of both
the cost-benefit and technical-criteria tests).
25. Shapiro, Medical Treatment of Defective Newborns: An Answer to the 'Baby Doe' Di-
lemma, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 137 (1983). (Shapiro proposes a model statute to guide deci-
sionmaking in cases requiring substituted judgment and adopts a sanctity-of-life standard).
See generally Kuzma, The Legislative Response to Infant Doe, 59 IND. L.J. 377 (1984) (analysis
of federal regulations and state legislative responses to Indiana Baby Doe case and examination
of alternative state legislative solutions).
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consideration of social, economic, or familial factors for fear of opening the
door to legalized euthanasia.26 Indeed, several ethicists have observed that
there is no moral difference between killing handicapped newborn babies by
withholding proper medical treatment and killing them through direct
action."
Still others have argued for utilizing the quality-of-life standard as a basis
for the best-interests test. Under circumstances when surgery would prolong
the life of a severely retarded, epileptic, or paralyzed person, who would
experience a life of pain and severe disability, commentators have asserted
that treatment would not be in the patient's "best interest."2 This standard
operates under the assumption that a life with a severe handicap is a life not
worth living. According to the disability rights groups, such as the Associa-
tion for Retarded Citizens and the Spina Bifida Association, this assumption
is a discriminatory myth. These organizations proffer that handicapped per-
sons, even those with severe handicaps such as spina bifida, may live happy
and productive lives. They further note that accurately determining a handi-
capped newborn baby's prognosis is very difficult and uncertain.29
This author suggests that the best-interests test, based on the sanctity-of-
life standard, should be adopted as the sole basis of decisionmaking in this
area. Only this standard gives primary value to the interests of the child, is
based on bona fide medical considerations, and does not make discrimina-
tory judgments about the quality of a handicapped person's life.
The other dominant tests for decisionmaking suffer from fatal flaws.
First, the technical-criteria test is deficient because experience has demon-
strated that current medical knowledge is insufficient to determine a realistic
prognosis for a newborn baby. Also, this standard is based on speculative
and subjective judgments about the quality of life handicapped children lead
when they survive. Moreover, this standard promotes active euthanasia.
Second, the cost-benefit test unsuccessfully tries to apply mathematical and
economic theory mechanistically to a.-very human situation. Some factors
cannot be quantified, such as human emotions and cultural values about the
transcendant significance of human life. Finally, the best-interests test based
on the quality-of-life ethic suffers from unhelpful ambiguity and dangerous
subjectivity, in that it incorporates a broad array of irrelevant factors into
26. Horan & Grant, supra note 24, at 157-59. See also Weir, supra note 14, at 176 (a
philosopher maintains that voluntary euthanasia is acceptable when it is decided that for the
infant's best interests death is preferable to life).
27. Weir, supra note 14, at 152.
28. Arras, Toward an Ethic of Ambiguity, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1984, at 25.
29. Memorandum of Amici at 4-5, American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F.
Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
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the medical decisionmaking process, such as concerns of society and family.
It also relies on the myth that a life with a handicap is not worth living.
Unfortunately, this last standard seems to be the one that the federal courts
prefer.
B. Federal Courts Lean Toward Quality-of-Life Standard
During the last three years, efforts to establish the sanctity-of-life standard
by using already existing civil rights legislation have been thwarted by the
federal courts. A review of the controlling cases demonstrates how the
courts' misunderstanding of some critical issues has resulted in dicta expres-
sing a preference for the quality-of-life standard.
1. Background of the Controlling Cases
The public uproar caused by the starvation death of Baby Doe in Indiana
prompted President Ronald Reagan to instruct the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) on April 30, 1982, to issue a
notice to health care providers that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 forbids recipients of federal funds from withholding from handicapped
citizens any benefit or health care that would be provided to persons without
handicaps.30 Ten months after sending the notice to approximately 7,000
hospitals, HHS issued interim regulations on March 7, 1983, to explain the
procedures and guidelines relating to the health care of handicapped new-
born babies under Section 504.
These regulations were promptly challenged in federal court by a coalition
of medical organizations in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler.31
On April 14, 1983, Judge Gesell for the federal District Court in the District
of Columbia ruled in American Academy of Pediatrics that the regulations
were invalid as arbitrary and capricious, and that they violated statutory
procedural requirements. 32 Accordingly, in July, 1983, HHS issued revised
regulations.
Pursuant to the new rules, the Justice Department intervened in a sus-
pected case of nontreatment in New York on November 2, 1983.33 In this
30. 49 Fed. Reg. 1622-23 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84). Section 504 is the
civil rights statute for handicapped citizens, and it provides that "No otherwise qualified hand-
icapped individual in the United States, . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be ex-
cluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial asssistance..." Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
31. 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
32. Id. at 403.
33. United States v. University Hospital, 557 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
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case, a baby girl (Baby Jane Doe) born on October 11, 1983, suffered from
several medical conditions. The most serious were spina bifida, microceph-
aly (an abnormally small head) and hydrocephalus (an accumulation of fluid
on the brain). The first pediatric neurosurgeon to examine her recom-
mended immediate surgery to close the spinal opening and implant a shunt
to relieve fluid pressure in the cranial cavity. After consulting with other
physicians, the parents decided against surgery and chose instead to provide
only nutrition, antibiotics, and a dressing for the baby's exposed spinal sac. 4
Suspicious that Baby Jane Doe was the victim of discriminatory nontreat-
ment and acting under the authority of Section 504, the Justice Department
requested the child's medical records.35 The hospital repeatedly refused to
turn them over, and the government brought suit against the hospital in
United States v. University Hospital but lost the case in both federal district
and appellate courts. The federal regulations were ruled invalid by the Sec-
ond Circuit on the grounds that they were issued without statutory author-
ity.36 This decision is presently being reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court.37
2. Analysis of the Courts' Rulings
The courts in American Academy of Pediatrics and University Hospital did
not rule explicitly on the issue of the standard of decisionmaking in medical
treatment for handicapped newborn babies; however, both courts revealed
their leanings on this crucial matter toward the quality-of-life standard. In
American Academy of Pediatrics, Judge Gesell criticized the HHS regula-
tions for establishing a standard that looks only to the medical factors with-
out considering parental wishes, home life, and cost. 38 Though he suggested
that grounds may exist for promulgating regulatory guidelines for the treat-
ment of handicapped newborn babies, he found no expressed congressional
suggestion that Section 504 should be used to monitor the medical treatment
of defective newborn infants.39 Gesell did find the suggestion reasonable that
Section 504 prohibits denial of the most basic services, "such as access to
medical care, hospital facilities, or food, to a mildly handicapped child
whose parents want him to benefit from those services."'  Under this stan-
34. United States v. University Hospital, 729 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 1984).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 161.
37. Heckler v. American Hospital Association, No. 84-1529 (2d Cir. Order, December 27,
1984), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985).
38. 561 F. Supp. at 400.
39. Id. at 401.
40. Id. at 402 (emphasis added).
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dard, even mildly handicapped infants would not qualify for treatment if the
parents did not want their child to benefit from medical services. The prob-
lem with this standard is that it is based on the desires of the parents rather
than the interests of the infant. Moreover, Gesell confused the issue of
which standard should be used in decisionmaking with the issue of who
should be the decisionmaker.
The majority in University Hospital relied heavily on the American Acad-
emy of Pediatrics decision and refused to acknowledge any distinction be-
tween a discriminatory decision and a medical decision.4 1 The court stated
that the government had too simplistic a view of the medical decisionmaking
process. They found it too difficult to say definitively when the decision to
withhold treatment could be discriminatory, especially when the handicap
was either related to, or was the condition, to be treated.42 The court re-
jected the government's argument that a discriminatory and a bona fide
medical decision could be distinguished by looking at the motive for non-
treatment. The government's position is that if the lifesaving treatment is
withheld because the child would still be handicapped after the treatment,
then it is irrelevant whether the treatment is for the handicapping condition,
a related condition or an unrelated condition. The decision is dis-
criminatory.4 3
In University Hospital, the court's logic would preclude any possible find-
ing that a decision to withhold treatment is discriminatory since the court
believed that it cannot distinguish between bona fide medical decisions and
those based on handicap. This logic leaves little protection for the handi-
capped infant who needs life-saving surgery if the parents and physicians
decide to withhold treatment based on the fact that the child will continue to
be handicapped after treatment.
In opposition to the court's preference for the quality-of-life standard in
these two cases, the dissent in University Hospital agreed with the govern-
ment's argument that a decision to withhold treatment on the basis of handi-
cap is discriminatory. Judge Winter found that the law can distinguish
between a discriminatory decision and a medical decision, and that protec-
41. It is possible to delineate between a medical and a discriminatory decision. A doctor
makes a valid medical decision when based on his medical knowledge and skill, he determines
that the treatment will (1) cure or substantially alleviate the medical problem, (2) prolong life
for a reasonable length of time, or (3) relieve pain. On the other hand, a doctor makes a
discriminatory decision when he utilizes factors outside the purview of his medical expertise.
For example, the physician may think that life with a handicap is too burdensome on the
patient, the patient's family or to society in general. Gerry, The Civil Rights of Handicapped
Infants: An Oklahoma "Experiment," I ISSUES IN L. & MED. 20-25 (1985).
42. 729 F.2d. at 156-157.
43. 49 Fed. Reg. 1637 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84).
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tion is warranted for a child denied medical care on the basis of his handi-
cap." The dissent also stated that while the majority seems to be unable to
decide what a bona fide medical judgment is, the application of the analogy
to race should make it clear:
A judgment not to perform certain surgery because a person is
black is not a bona fide medical judgment. So too, a decision not to
correct a life threatening digestive problem because an infant has
Down's Syndrome is not a bona fide medical judgment.4"
C. Congressional Support for the Sanctity-of-Life Standard
Both the American Academy of Pediatrics and University Hospital opinions
based their analysis on their finding that congressional intent was not clear
about whether Section 504 should include handicapped newborn babies."
Since then, Congress has expressed its intent to protect handicapped
newborns from invalid nontreatment decisions by enacting amendments to
the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act. These amendments define
the failure to provide a handicapped infant with medically indicated treat-
ment as a form of child abuse that would be subject to state action.47 The
44. 729 F.2d. at 162-63 (Winter, J., dissenting).
45. Id Judge Winter notes that "if that interpretation stands, the handicapped will be
deprived of a fairly won political victory and exposed to the possibility of future decisions
excluding other services from coverage by Section 504."
For an international comparison, see Smith, The Plight of the Genetically Handicapped New-
born: A Comparative Anaylsis, 9 HOLDSWORTH L. REV. 164 (1984); see also Smith, Defective
Newborns and Government Intermeddling, 25 MED. SCIENCE & L. 44 (1985); Smith, Handi-
capped Babies and The Law, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTITIONER, Sept. 1984, at 86.
46. The American Academy of Pediatrics court found that the regulations were invalid on
the grounds that they were arbitrary and capricious and violated requirements of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. The court said that it needed clarification from Congress before it
could decide if Section 504 reached handicapped newborn babies. 561 F. Supp. at 403. In
University Hospital, the court ruled that it was unclear whether Congress intended protection
from Section 504 to extend to handicapped newborn babies. 729 F.2d at 161.
47. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 98-457, tit. 1, § 121-28, 98
Stat. 1749, 1752-55 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5101-5103 (Supp. 1985)). [hereinafter cited as
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984].
The Child Abuse Amendments do not provide civil rights protection to the handicapped
newborn and do not provide a mechanism for the federal government to either investigate or
take any enforcement action. Paulus, Supreme Court Asked to Review Application of Rehabili-
tation Act to Medical Decisions, I ISSUES IN L. & MED. 69, 75-76 (1985); Civil Rights Commis-
sion Hearings, supra note 13, at 466-67 (Testimony by Charles Cooper, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice) ("I think it is
important to keep in mind that the Child Abuse Act . . . does not in any way place any
independent federal duty on hospitals or health care services programs . . . . [W]ithout 504
there is no duty of nondiscrimination that emanates from federal law anyway on the hospital
and health care providers themselves.").
Disability rights organizations want protection for handicapped newborn babies through
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standard adopted under this new law is a sanctity-of-life standard, and is
supported by all the major disability rights organizations, pro-life groups,
and the American Academy of Pediatrics, which had challenged the 504
regulations earlier.4"
Under the new law, withholding treatment would only be justified if, in
the physician's reasonable medical judgment, one of three clearly defined
situations existed. First, the infant was chronically and irreversibly coma-
tose. Second, the treatment would only prolong dying, or third, the treat-
ment would not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's
life-threatening conditions or would be futile in terms of the survival of the
infant.49
Use of this standard offers the three benefits of clarity, reasonableness, and
nondiscrimination. First, the standard is clear because it is based solely on
bona fide medical criteria. It is reasonable because it allows physicians to
consider information within their expertise but prevents them from consider-
ing non-medical issues. It is nondiscriminatory because it focuses only on
the health interests of the patient and does not permit subjective value judg-
ments to enter into the decisionmaking process.
During the legislative process for this bill, the American Medical Associa-
tion (A.M.A.) wanted to add wording to the statute that would have allowed
withholding of treatment in cases where treatment would be "inhumane and
unconscionable" and would result in intense suffering. This wording was
rejected by the disability rights organizations because of its vagueness, and
Congress chose not to adopt the A.M.A.'s language.
50
In summary, the courts should follow the lead of Congress, the Reagan
administration, the disability rights organizations, and the right-to-life
groups by adopting the sanctity-of-life standard, because it is clear, reason-
able, and nondiscriminatory. Just as the courts have heeded the counsel of
those who faced racial discrimination, they should listen to America's dis-
abled citizens who have consistently sought to destroy the myth that the life
of a severely handicapped person is not worth living. As one disabled adult
observed at the United States Civil Rights Commission hearing in June,
1985, the main problem for handicapped children is not their disabilities, it
both federal civil rights statutes and state abuse laws. Representatives of the organizations
have testified that if the Supreme Court affirms the Second Circuit opinion, then they will
lobby Congress to amend Section 504 to include infants explicitly under the provisions of
federal law protecting handicapped individuals. Glasow, Advocates, Medical Community Clash
Over Federal Role in "Baby Doe" Cases, Nat'l Right to Life News, July 25, 1985, at 5, col. 1.
48. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, 98 Stat. at 1752 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5101-
5103 (Supp. 1985)).
49. Id.
50. Editorial, A. Med. News 4 (Aug. 1984).
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is "the prejudice and the discrimination to which they are going to be sub-
jected by the remainder of society."'"
III. THE DECISIONMAKER
Once a standard for decisionmaking is established, debate naturally shifts
to the issue of who should be the decisionmaker. For example, should the
parents of the handicapped child be given the ultimate decisionmaking
power? Should the physician, who is more knowledgeable medically, de-
cide? Should a hospital ethics committee have a role? Should the govern-
ment ever assume the role as the child's advocate?
Parents are supposed to be their child's best advocate, and the law as-
sumes that they will make decisions in their child's best interest.5 2 In real-
ity, however, when parents discover that their long-expected infant is born
with a handicap, they often experience a period of emotional trauma and
become unable to make a dispassionate decision.5 3
During this period, when parents are confronted with the need to make
life-and-death decisions regarding the medical care for their child, they natu-
rally rely heavily on their physician's advice. Unfortunately, they often re-
ceive inaccurate or biased information.54 In June, 1985, Dr. C. Everett
Koop, Surgeon General of the United States and a world-renowned pediatric
surgeon, testified before the United States Civil Rights Commission during
hearings on handicapped newborn babies on this crucial issue. In his opin-
ion, too often doctors influence parents to not treat the child because the
health professional is either ignorant of the hopeful long-term prognosis for
handicapped people or prejudiced against handicapped people.55
Later at the civil rights hearings, representatives of several medical organi-
zations rebutted Koop's assertions. They contended that doctors were the
best advocates of the handicapped newborn babies' rights.56 However, per-
sonal experiences described by parents of handicapped children who ap-
peared before the Commission undercut that assertion.57 According to the
parents, the physicians had given them inaccurately dim prognoses for both
51. Civil Rights Commission Hearings, supra note 13, at 245.
52. PRESIDENT'S COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORIAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT 212 (1983) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
53. Kuzma, supra note 25, at 382.
54. Civil Rights Commission Hearings, supra note 13, at 15 (testimony of David McLone,
M.D., Chairman of the Division of Pediatric Neurosurgey at Children's Memorial Hospital,
Chicago, Illinois).
55. Id. at 24.
56. Id. at 86-87.
57. Id. at 121, 128, 140-41.
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their children's immediate chances for survival and long-term ability to at-
tain a normal level of mental and physical existence if they did survive.58 In
fact, one parent was convinced that the children were "at the mercy of the
doctors."59
The most dramatic recent example where the physicians allegedly gave
parents biased and inaccurate information occurred in Oklahoma. As de-
scribed in an article in the October, 1983, issue of Pediatrics, the official
journal of the American Academy of Pediatricians, a team of doctors at the
Oklahoma Children's Memorial Hospital conducted an experiment using a
quality-of-life formula to decide whether or not to treat handicapped new-
born children.6" Over an extended period of time, they used a mathematical
formula as the basis for decisions not to treat twenty-four infants with spina
bifida.61 The derivation of this formula is important to understanding how
the treatment decisions were made.
In this formula, the "quality of life" [QL] which a child could achieve,
equalled the "natural endowment of the child" [NE] multiplied by the sum
of two factors, "contributions from home" [H] plus "contributions from so-
ciety" [S], QL = NE X (H + S).62 In the article in Pediatrics, the authors
asserted that the prognosis for babies with identical medical indicators could
be quite different depending on contributions from home and society.
6 3
After the team of physicians applied the formula and reached a decision
not to treat an infant, they met with the parents to present that recommen-
dation. The doctors did not inform the parents about either the criteria or
the formula they had used to reach that decision. The parents were only
told that the recommendation reflected the doctor's best medical
judgment."
Those nontreatment decisions had dramatic and fatal consequences for
the infants involved. All twenty-four babies whose parents agreed with the
doctor's recommendation for nontreatment died.65 In Pediatrics, the physi-
cians assessed the outcome of this experiment in this manner:
The "untreated survivor" has not been a significant problem in our
experience. All 24 babies who have not been treated at all have
died at an average of 37 days [after birth]. These data indicate to
us that we are able to select babies with a more positive outlook-
58. Id
59. Id. at 142-43.
60. Gross, supra note 10.
61. Id. at 456.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Gerry, supra note 41, at 35.
65. Gross, supra note 10, at 452-53.
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the only nonsurvivor of 36 babies for whom vigorous treatment
was recommended died as a result of a motor vehicle accident."
Following the publication of the article, the Cable News Network (CNN)
broadcasted an extensive program with interviews with the parents of the
infants involved in the experiment. 67 Many stated that they had no knowl-
edge of the use of the formula, and several expressed anger that the doctors
had taken such authority on themselves. Some parents of children who had
been treated expressed relief that their children had not been selected to
die.6 s
The Oklahoma experiment vividly illustrated the failure of doctors to
communicate vitally important information to parents. The President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behaviorial Research came to similar conclusions regarding the flaws in
the communication process in a report released in March, 1983.69 The
Commission found that the medical providers have not done enough to pro-
vide parents with appropriate information, and that physicians and parents
often -base life-and-death decisions on invalid preconceptions they have
about the quality of life of handicapped individuals.70 The Commission re-
commended that "professional associations and health care institutions
should help ensure that the best information is available and is used when
decisions about life-sustaining treatment are made.",7 1 In this connection, a
specialist in the care of children with spina bifida has noted that, in his ex-
tensive experience, fully informed parents have never refused treatment for
their child.72
Lack of accurate information is not the only reason a parent may not
always serve as the best decisionmaker. If the parent's choice of action is
based on the quality-of-life standard, then the decision may violate the
child's right to life and right to medical care, equivalent to that provided to
non-handicapped children. At a time when the parents are emotionally dis-
traught and exhausted, they may only see that the child will be both a finan-
cial and psychological burden on the family.73 Thus, they may base their
66. Id. at 455.
67. Sherwood, Who Lives, Who Dies? -Part 1, Cable News Network Documentary, Ra-
dio TV Monitoring Service Transcript (Feb. 21, 1984).
68. Id On October 3, 1985, a class action suit was filed on behalf of infants with disabili-
ties and their parents alleging that the Oklahoma infants had been discriminatorily denied
beneficial medical treatment. Johnson v. Sullivan, No. Civ. 85-2434A (W.D. Okla.).
69. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 52, at 209-10.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 224.
72. Civil Rights Commission Hearings, supra note 13, at 40.
73. Kuzma, supra note 25, at 382.
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decision not to treat on their own and their family's best interests rather than
those of their infant.
Sometimes, when the parents decide against treatment, the doctor may
disagree with them and seek a judicial order for treatment.74 The law is
clear that although parents have the right to control the treatment, upbring-
ing, and welfare of their children, this right is not absolute. 75 When the
child's welfare is at stake, the state may intervene.76 State authority to inter-
vene can derive from either state child-abuse or child-neglect legislation or
the common law doctrine ofparens patriae.77 Under this doctrine, while it is
presumed that the parents will provide their children with the necessities of
life, their failure to do so allows the state to intervene.78 The state's interest
in protecting children is indeed compelling, for it has been found to prevail
over claims of religious freedom when parents refuse to consent to blood
transfusions for their children on the ground that the practice violates their
religion.79
What happens, however, if both the doctor and the parents decide to with-
hold treatment using a decision process based on the quality-of-life stan-
dard? Obviously, the child is left without an advocate unless the state may
intercede. One of the principal purposes of the section 504 regulations was
to provide a mechanism for the federal government to investigate and pro-
vide protection in such a case.8" According to the regulations, anyone could
report a suspected ,case of discriminatory nontreatment to HHS via a tele-
phone hotline. The Department then could seek medical records to deter-
mine whether the child was being denied equal and adequate medical care.8"
One of the major criticisms of the 504 regulations was that they allowed the
government to intervene in the decisions that many felt should be left solely
74. In Application of Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
75. United States v. Onto, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53
(1973); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923).
76. In re Phillip Becker, 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (1979).
77. Id. at 51.
78. Id.
79. Jehovah's Witnesses in Washington v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D.
Wash. 1967), aftd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968). See also Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Jackson, 62 Md. App.
-, 489 A. 2d 1130 1985) (The court ruled that a competent, conscious, rational, and pregnant
adult may refuse, for religious reasons, to submit to blood transfusions during a caesarean
section if the surgery does not endanger the life of the child); Crouse Irving Memorial Hosp.
Inc. v. Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (New York Court
ordered the hospital to give both mother and child blood transfusions during caesarean section
even though it violated the parents' religious beliefs because the state has an overriding interest
in the welfare of the child).
80. 49 Fed. Reg. 1622-23 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84).
81. Id. at 1623.
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to the parents in consultation with their physician. 2 The primary right of
parents to choose the medical care for their children was raised as a defense
against any power of the government to intervene. 83
As noted earlier, the federal courts invalidated these regulations on proce-
dural grounds.8" In American Academy of Pediatrics, while Judge Gesell
would not rule on the constitutional aspects of parental rights, he did say
that "to the extent the regulation is read to eliminate the role of the infant's
parents in choosing an appropriate course of medical treatment, its applica-
tion may in some cases infringe upon the interests outlined in cases such as
Carey v. Population Services International " The Second Circuit opinion in
University Hospital also suggested that the authority of the governmental
agency to gain access to the infant's medical records might implicate paren-
tal and privacy rights. 6 In spite of all of the dicta, no federal court has yet
decided the issue of who the proper decisionmaker should be, possibly be-
cause no court has yet definitively settled on the proper standard of
decisionmaking.
Congress however, in the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, has made it
clear that no decisionmaker may use the quality-of-life standard as the basis
of a decison to withhold care. 7 As described in section two, the Act has
adopted a sanctity-of-life standard that must be used by any deci-
sionmaker88 The Act implicitly allows the parents to be the decisionmaker
unless they make a discriminatory decision that violates the child's right to
"medically indicated treatment."8 9 If suspicion exists that the parents have
made an invalid decision, then the Act has designated the state protective
service agency as the proper governmental body to protect the infant.9" Ba-
sically, the case will be treated like any other child abuse case; however, the
Act also requires the agency to identify a contact person in the medical facil-
ity to initiate and pursue a suspected case. The agency must also insure that
the state law authorizes it to go to court to intervene in a suspected case. 91
Whether the state agency will prove to be the child's best advocate will
82. Kuzma, supra note 25, at 398-400.
83. Id.
84. Supra note 46.
85. 561 F. Supp. at 403.
86. 729 F.2d at 150.
87. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878, 14,888 (1985) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340).
88. Id.
89. Id
90. Id. at 14,878.
91. Murray, The Final, Anticlimactic Rule on Baby Doe, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
June 1985, at 6.
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depend upon the strength of each state's respective child abuse law,92 and
how aggressively the agency complies with the federal mandate. The only
sanction for noncompliance by the agency is the loss of federal funds.93 This
is a limited penalty because federal funding to start protective service agen-
cies is minimal at present.94
Commentators have recommended that hospital ethics committees func-
tion either as the final decisionmaker or as an aid to help parents decide
whether to treat their handicapped newborn children." The better idea,
however, is to have the committee operate as a body that both educates the
parents and protects the child from discriminatory nontreatment. This pol-
icy choice is evident in the Model Guidelines for Health Care Providers to
Establish Infant Care Review Committees, published by HHS, which recom-
mended that the hospitals establish Infant Care Review Committees (ICRC)
to "assure that medical treatment decisions are informed, thoughtful, and
consistent with proper medical standards., 96 The guidelines state that the
review committees should apply the same sanctity-of-life standard of deci-
sionmaking that appears in the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 regula-
tions.97 Moreover, HHS explains that the aim of the basic policy is to
"prevent the withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled in-
fants with life-threatening conditions. '"8
The guidelines recommend that the ICRCs include individuals from a va-
riety of disciplines and perspectives, including medical professionals, social
workers, a representative from a disability rights group, a lay community
member, clergy, perhaps a lawyer, and "other individuals with knowledge
and perspectives valuable to effective action on particular functions and ac-
tivities of the ICRC." 99 If the committee operates properly under the guide-
lines, it can provide parents with vital emotional and informational support.
The parents need to know both the status of the law and what resources are
available in the community for the care of their child. Without the restraints
in the HHS guidelines, however, the committee could easily become an ad-
vocate of a discriminatory decision, especially if the committee uses or per-
mits the use of a quality-of-life standard of decisionmaking."
92. Kuzma, supra note 25.
93. Murray, supra note 91, at 6.
94. Id.
95. Guidelines for Infant Bioethics Committees, 74 PEDIATRIcS 306 (1984); Kuzma, supra
note 25, at 406.
96. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,893 (1985) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340).
97. Id. at 14,894-95.
98. Id. at 14,894 (emphasis added).
99. Id.
100. Kuzma, supra note 25, at 408-09.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
The courts should adopt the sanctity-of-life standard as the basis for de-
ciding when to withhold treatment from a handicapped newborn baby be-
cause it is clear, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. Only this standard
gives primary value to the interests of the child, is based on bona fide medi-
cal considerations, and does not make discriminatory judgments about the
quality of a handicapped person's life. .
The quality-of-life standard, on the other hand, views less-than-perfect life
as valuable only in relation to other societal interests, such as parental
wishes, cost of care, or a subjective view that life with a severe handicap is
not a life worth living. 10' This standard has been denounced by disability
rights organizations, pro-life groups, Congress, and the Reagan administra-
tion as violative of the civil right of handicapped newborn babies to receive
medical care equal to that given to nonhandicapped children.
Although the law should presume that the parents are the best deci-
sionmakers for their child's medical care, if the parents make a discrimina-
tory decision that care should be withheld, then the state should have the
right to act as the child's advocate.'0 2 The physicians should make certain
that the parents are fully informed as to all pertinent medical information.
The doctors should not, however, venture outside of their expertise and base
their prognoses for the child on social and economic factors. A hospital
ethics committee has the important function of providing information, sup-
port, and counseling, but its primary duty should be to insure that the par-
ents understand the ethical restraints on their decisions imposed by the
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984.
Suzanne B. Glasow
101. See generally Smith, Long Days Journey into Night: The Tragedy of the Handicapped
at Risk Infant4 in MORAL ISSUES IN MENTAL RETARDATION 129 (I. Laura & A. Ashman ed.
1985).
102. See Smith, supra note 24, at 731.
